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First, a few words about theomists and theomism.
According to theomism, a theomist is someone who can make mistakes. Given that everyone can make mistakes, each of us is a theomist. We are all theomists.
The basis of theomism is the possibility of error, i.e. the realization that you can always make mistakes in everything, anyone and everyone can make mistakes. This means that there are no rules in the world, but only a set of conditional criteria for what is considered correct and what is considered erroneous. That is, our so-called meaningful and ordered world is a house of cards that you can blow on and it will fall apart. Relatively speaking, everything is conditional. Philosophy, logic, science, religion is just a text: an interpretation that interprets an interpretation; a set of assumptions, hypotheses, a sequence of words.
According to theomism, it is impossible to be sure of anything – you can only pretend to be sure, pretend that you are sure of something, because you can always make a mistake. You can pretend both consciously and unconsciously. Most people pretend unconsciously: they are not aware that they are pretending, but they are pretending.
Now, as for the question. According to the theory of potentiality (its ontological side) we live in an actual impossible world, where nothing has ever been, is not and will not be, but can always be. Actually, here is the answer: in an impossible world, even God is impossible.
About the question:
What theomists say? “Names?” What exactly do they say? “Quotes?” Where do they talk? “Texts?”
Theomists don't say that… since they do not speak at all, since there are no theomists (in the plural) at all π The same question (the difference in naming ” god ” / “God” is irrelevant because of illiteracy, the difference in the topic “Religion”/ ” Religion. God. Theomism. Philosophy ” irrelevant (from trickery), set a year ago-in August 2015 (https://thequestion.ru/questions/27566/pochemu-teomisty-govoryat-chto-bog-nevozmozhen) did not bring out a single theomist for frankness/did not reveal. But the only comment on this topic by Alexander Tabakaev was immediately to the point: “Self-promotion is ugly and stupid”!
This ” sam “is one, but many-faced theomist: “Yuri Saprykin”, aka “Viktor Shamirov”, aka “Ivan Alekseev”, aka” Walter Mitty”, aka” Alexey Makarshin”, aka… That's right, ” Theo Om.”.. And this is not “possible”, but for the given case the only possible, i.e., the actual state of affairs with “theomists”.
About theomism:
The so-called “book” (“Teaism” https://bookmate.com/books/PpVeSEbB) book is not: not only missing any signs of traditional books (it still could be interpreted as samizdat), and any work authorization (which even for literary hoaxes required) β the definition and correlation of the figures of the author of the teachings, the author of the text, commentator, editor, and publisher… Even Christ speaks through the mouth of the evangelists and with “direct speech” (as a linguistic device), and not with direct speech:)
The text “Theomism” is a quasi-epistemic opus that tries to refute, build on, parody, and identify with religion, science, and philosophy. The degree of sincerity and conscientiousness of such an attempt-see above and in the comments to the topic. The degree of literacy and meaningfulness is obvious from this very intention “to sit on all the chairs”: the author simply spits on W. Occam and K. Prutkov, “multiplying entities unnecessarily” and “embracing the vast”.
The content of the text does not surprise the knowledgeable reader: once again, in several theoretical questions / theses/postulates, the principle of the world is comprehended β “and this I saw” … And what is the form of this opus? What are the most obvious (to the literate) signs of quasi-knowledge communicated by theomism with the tired modesty of a saviour? For lack of time, only a few:
3.1. Conceptual confusion or “confusion of languages”:
3.1.1. “Babylonian”: when concepts, concepts and methodological principles are different (and sometimes competing with each other!) discursive practices-philosophy, religion, science, art-are used (correlated and linked) as single-order, and the differences (and contradictions) between them are not removed, but simply ignored. This kind of misunderstanding is the entire text, one of its concentrated manifestations β “The statement” I exist ” can be considered as a kind of epistemological Higgs boson for other statements. So, the statement “it hurts me” has an ontological mass (interpreted as pain) only when a person believes in his own existence, when the thesis “I exist” is accepted by him completely and unconditionally” – A statement worthy of being an answer to “Could you play a nocturne on a drainpipe flute?”, but not to “What does the statement” meanI exist”?”
And so onβ¦
3.1.2. “French with Nizhny Novgorod”: when the difference between a term, concept, category and different-level forms of description of the object (s) under study is not recognized or consciously leveled behind the general verbal shell, the established and working subject and professional thesaurus is ignored out of ignorance.
“The fundamental epistemological question of theomism (theo-question): what if X is wrong? is it possible? or is it impossible? Where X is any subject of the utterance: man, artificial intelligence, other entity” – For God's sake, an epistemological question β even a trivial one, not a fundamental one-is not a question about the erroneous X, but a question about the relation of X and our knowledge about it! Or about the relation of the knowledge that X himself knows to what is the subject (content) of this knowledge! “X is any subject of an utterance”? β Is it really about the “subject of an utterance” (see the dictionary of logic)? Or about the “speaking subject”? If the latter, then the status ” any ” = “random” completely disavows the pathetic “fundamentality” of the question. If the former, then there is no question at all, but there is an assumption, i.e. conditional, but a statement! And the “possible-impossible” hullabaloo shakes the assumption and its conditions, not what is allowed to be doubted. Don Quixote, fighting with the windmills, looks somehow more honest against this background β an imaginary giant actually slapped him in the face!
“The question of theology forms a theo-thesis (the Fundamental epistemological thesis of theomism), according to which all our judgments are potentially erroneous judgments, i.e. hypothetical, formal, conditional, indefinite.” – Apple from the apple tree… :))) The question was not answered, because ” yes ” (oh how!) the thesis, although the latter is not directly stated, but commented on: with some caution β ” according to which…”, but with the same universalist fervor β “all our judgments…”! Whose “our judgments” are these? The judgments of theomism are not potentially wrong (once), but quite actual-here and now: see the preceding and subsequent critiques. True critical judgments themselves can also be criticized and overcome (with the so-called falsificationism and/or fallibilism), but not because of their “potential fallacy” as “innate inferiority”, but because of other available or possible more accurate and meaningful arguments in favor of the present or alternative one (but in no way coinciding with theomism!). a different position. “Erroneous judgments, i.e. hypothetical, formal, conditional, indefinite… ” β five adjectives (definitions) in a row, but none of the subsequent ones defines the first one, does not indicate signs of error! And only two of them β “hypothetical” and “conditional” – have a common logical basis!
“A theo-thesis … forms a theo-postulate (the fundamental epistemological postulate of theomism): the world is a text: a space of total interpretation, a closed chain of signifiers ” – More coal in the fire of reason!: why is this question and thesis “epistemological” and the postulate suddenly “epistemological”? In order to exclude any possibility of correlating the definition with reality reality was excluded from the definition? :))) It will not work: to compare the world (reality) a text that is subject to total interpretation can only be interpreted on the assumption of a certain meta-reality that encompasses both the interpreted text-world and the interpreter (real or transcendental). And in what methodological projection of knowledge is it possible to think of a postulate as a consequence and conclusion? Firstly, the” postulate being formed “is contradictio in adjecto, and secondly, why is it needed if the main theomist immediately suggests “in the future… to proceed precisely from … world perception”, in which “traditionally we do not perceive the world as a text, as a space of total interpretation, but perceive it as an empirical reality given to us in sensations”? Is it worth building a vegetable garden? Wonderful are your deeds, Theo Om!:)
And so onβ¦
3.2. Paralogisms or incorrect and false conclusions:
3.2.1. ” The theory of potentiality β theo-theory) is a ring road from epistemology to ontology. Thus, the theory of potentiality is both an epistemological and an ontological theory” – a metaphorically (!) expressed relation (connection) of two objects “in such a conjuring way! – image ” turns into an independent object of dual nature!
3.2.2. ” Does God exist? Okay, we agree, but what if we're wrong? Is it possible? Or is it impossible? Does God not exist? Okay, we agree with that, but what if we're wrong again?” β The non-existence of an object is not deduced from a doubt of its existence, much less from a doubt of the thesis of its existence! Agreeing with a thesis is incompatible with doubting the content of that thesis. So the two “we's” of the second (and sixth as well) phrase are self-names of two different subjects that can be correlated, but not opposed in any way to each other in a way that confuses the reader!
And so onβ¦
3.3. Non-reflexivity of statements as a conscious or naive elimination of the speaker from the spoken content, making the author himself outside of his statements.
“Like any other theory, our theory starts with an error. More precisely, with the possibility of error” β a theory that claims to be true (infallible) begins with a universal one (by the way, why “any theory”? – at least name one!), but someone else's mistakes. Your mistake (or trick?) the author hides in a pile of quasi-questions thrown at each other: “But what if we are wrong in thinking that anything is possible? What if this is an error? Is it possible? Or is it impossible? What if the theory question is a flawed question? Is it possible? Or is it impossible? But what if we're still wrong? What if this question is also a mistake? Is it possible? Or is it impossible? What if you can't ask such questions? Is it possible? Or is it impossible? What if the sky falls to the ground, if we keep asking about it? Is it possible? Or is it impossible? What if we burn in hell if we ask these questions? Is it possible? Or is it impossible? What if all these questions are absurd and completely meaningless? Is it possible? Or is it impossible? But what if this question is also a mistake? Is it possible? Anything is possible. Everything is the will of the Possible.” β Behind the apparent totality of questioning, the almost dialectical structure of the statement shines through: “negation of negation” = affirmation of negation-see the eighth, ninth and twenty-fourth sentences. “The confidence with which people pronounce certain judgments is a fiction, a deception, an appearance” – but does this assessment not apply to the final statement of the previous quote, i.e., to theomism itself? Does not this performative contradiction between the content of the utterance and the very existence of the utterance reveal that the so β called “theory” not only begins with an error, but also continues with it and ends in the same way-the obsessive tautology “everything is possible” disavows itself as valid and worthy of serious attention?
And so on……………………………………….
I finish β about my answer. The rest is about the question, its subject, and the “creed” of both. Dixi et salvavi animam meam!