Does the punishment of criminals fit into deontological / Kantian morality?
If so, isn't this something akin to utilitarianism?I am familiar with the first one 50/50 or 75/25 in favor of "familiar", and for me it is something like "use the established rules and do not deviate from them in any case" (in particular, in Kant-set rules in which people will be the end (whatever that means), and do not have internal contradictions (if everyone followed the rule "break promises", promises would disappear and there would be nothing to break), and even worse nizza, it also becomes a means). You can't lie, you can't steal, etc…. But you can't restrict the freedom of movement of other people, and yet, with criminals, this is done for the benefit of other members of society. Is there a separate rule about them (as an exception to the general rule)? If this rule allows the infliction of harm for the sake of reducing its total number (there will be fewer crimes), then why can't other similar rules be invented and, if possible, how will all this differ from consequentialism (more precisely, from utilitarianism)?
You can punish them in different ways. You can make a person an example to others – “this is what will happen to you if”. And such a punishment contradicts Kantian morality, a person becomes a means. And you can punish a person, having his correction as a goal. Yes, this dramatically narrows the range of permissible punishments, prohibiting anything that does not contribute to the correction of criminals. And yes, strictly speaking, this is no longer quite a “punishment”. Even if it is still a deprivation of liberty, it is made for a completely different purpose and, therefore, should be arranged differently.
Look, for example, at Scandinavian criminology, which is based on just such principles.