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What did Popper do for science? He proposed a draft of how it should be organized, a set of principles by which it should function. Like any good project, it is idealistic, you can strive for it, but you can't approach it. Like any good project, it is based on an analysis of the existing situation, it tries to bring to the light of reason those principles that were previously intuitive, to turn following them from an accident into a rule. Like any good project, it was too good for real life.
How exactly did Popper's project fail?
First, we do not always have the opportunity to test the hypothesis by experiment. This is especially true for the humanities. In this case, we will have to choose a hypothesis on other grounds – first of all, on the basis of whether it stands up to theoretical criticism, whether it provides the most complete explanation, and whether it fits in with other hypotheses. Let's call this a broad interpretation of the principle of falsification, when we allow different ways of refutation, not just a head-on collision with experience.
Secondly, it was initially assumed that the theory should be rejected if it is falsified, but in practice it is easier to correct it.
Strictly speaking, in none of these cases do we go against Popper – we are still testing hypotheses and still replacing incorrect hypotheses with correct ones, just clarified what it means to “check” and what it means to “replace”. After all, if there was a hypothesis “A+B+C”, and it became “A+B+C'”, these are two different hypotheses, aren't they?
I'll give you a brief overview of metaphysics and the Duhem-Quine thesis. Popper was never against metaphysics. His criticism of positivism included, among other things, the statement that it is impossible and undesirable to eliminate metaphysics. The idea of the “third world” is metaphysical. Popper was always aware that philosophy is not a science, and his project is unscientific and is not based on science. This is clearly stated in many places.
Duhem's thesis is quite obvious and does not show anything in itself. Science already does not claim to be true, and there is no need to further question these claims. Quine's thesis contains an error : since any statement makes sense only in the context of other statements, we cannot say that we are still dealing with the same statement if we have made sufficiently serious changes to other parts of the system. In other words, if we call a table a flat surface at waist level designed for different tasks, can we say that the concept of a table has not changed if we changed the meaning of the word “plane”?
I think this is incorrect.
Popper's criterion, falsifiability, has become a generally accepted standard of scientific methodology not by chance, not suddenly, not under the influence of authorities or fashion. It is concise, understandable, and describes the process of human knowledge accumulation in the language of formal logic, rather than”in general terms”. Moreover, even the average student of a technical university is able to deduce it logically on their own. Such transparency and visibility, in my opinion, provided it with its current status.
At the same time, falsifiability is not a dogma and can be criticized just like any other component of the scientific method. This is important, because if we want to consider the scientific method of cognition as a priority or the most effective among others, it (the scientific method) must allow itself to be studied with its own tools. In other words, if we improve our understanding of the world around us step by step in the course of scientific activity, nothing should prevent us from gradually improving our understanding of the scientific method itself.
Criticism of the Popper criterion is important in itself, as I have already written, in order to improve scientific methodology and develop the philosophy of science. The fact that there is criticism does not mean that the principle does not exist, it means that the principle itself was developed as a result of a scientific process and scientific discussion, and not taken arbitrarily.
Another respondent has already given examples of such criticism. Subjectively speaking, I believe that the mentioned problems for the Popper criterion are not the most serious. One of the oldest arguments against it, proposed almost a century ago, still remains unanswered: By itself, the Popper criterion is not falsifiable and, by its very definition, unscientific.
Yes, the Popper criterion is not ideal as a cognitive tool. Does this make it untenable? No, because there are simply no” ideal ” and always applicable tools in the scientific method – they all have areas and boundaries of application. Is it useful? Definitely. And its importance to the scientific community is a direct consequence of such usefulness.
In what situation can we talk about the failure of the Popper criterion? This statement will only be true if a more successful and less controversial alternative is proposed. We cannot simply abandon it; it would be a regression and a return to the very crisis of scientific knowledge that Popper's criterion was formulated to overcome. And we will remain with verifiability as the main criterion of scientific knowledge, and with it there are much more logical and philosophical problems and they are much more serious.
I'll refer to Лак Lakatos
The dogmatic falsificationist, according to his rules, must refer even the most significant scientific theories to metaphysics, where there is no place for rational discussion — if we proceed from the criteria of rationality, which are reduced to proofs and refutations — since metaphysical theories are neither provable nor refutable. Thus, the criterion of demarcation of the dogmatic falsificationist turns out to be highly antitheoretical
Taken from “Falsification and methodology of research programs”
And also �The Duhem — Quine thesis
The second version of the thesis formulated by Quine implies the non falsifiability of fundamental scientific theories the possibility of their endless adjustments based on new facts https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/DUEHM_—_QUAIN's Thesis