4 Answers

  1. It seems to me that those who somehow idialize this time (among my friends they simply do not exist, everyone is very negative about it) this is due to the fact that it was “everything is possible” right after “everything is impossible”. Imagine, until recently, a farmer risked his freedom by simply trading, and now trade as much as you want and what you want. Until recently, no business of their own, but now everyone can become a businessman (and sell cassettes in a stall near the market for their own pleasure).

    This is the euphoria of people who have been released from prison and have not yet realized that it is cold and hungry at large, and they are bare-assed and without the skills to survive in the world of capital.

  2. I believe that the main reason is that all the noughties told us how bad life was under Yeltsin, what a terrible and unsafe country Russia was, and how Putin brought the country out of chaos and chaos.

    But the reality is somewhat different: the main difference between the Russian Federation of the Yeltsin and Putin eras is oil prices. As oil prices collapsed and the West demonstrated that it would only cooperate with Putin and his entourage if it was absolutely necessary, the fairy tale of Putin's stability became less relevant to the everyday experience of citizens experiencing a catastrophic drop in living standards. This violated the unspoken social contract between the government and society: “You don't get involved in politics, we provide you with a certain level of stability, and sometimes even allow you to enjoy the show in the form of an active foreign policy.”�

    Since Russians tend to search for landmarks in the past, for some, Yeltsin's Russia began to appear as a state in which there was an illusion that people could take matters into their own hands, decide for themselves who would rule them, and where they could discuss any problem of society considered from various points of view not somewhere on the Internet, but on television and in newspapers. Whether this idea is fair is a separate question, but in the final analysis, we have a state where there really was a greater level of freedom of speech, where the authorities did not nightmare business (of course, there were bandits instead, but judging by personal communication with people who did business in the 90s, it was “easier to negotiate” with them) and where there was some political life. The only difference is that the Russian Federation of that format was catastrophically unlucky with oil prices, so “that country” had to turn around, attracting investment and trying to create something competitive instead of abandoning everything except the raw materials economy.

  3. All this is superficial. I'll answer you this way. “Yeltsin fans” or ” Yeltsinists “(also known as “YDB”) are a parody of the split in subcultural society (left and right, “bon” and “mongrel”). All these fans of Yeltsin are nothing more than a humorous reaction to political guidelines among subcultural youth (especially skinhead culture, you probably paid attention to the subscribers of such publics, all the skinhead, various mottos – “Yeltsin was a skin” or an image of Yeltsin and the inscription – “Fight for race, not class”).�
    In fact, no one sees Yeltsin as any serious politician, but on the contrary, they see him as a person who had fun and had a good rest, and also did not interfere with the life of ordinary people (which a priori looks at least stupid for a person who was in the position of President).�
    This is the third party in the subcultural movement, the party that seems to laugh at the “right” and “left”. They specifically use nationalist images and mottos in relation to Yeltsin (in order to sharpen the right-wing trends), and also hold actions “Booze instead of Bombs” (similar to the action “Food instead of Bombs”, which is carried out by left-wing trends in a subcultural environment, which also seems to show sharpness in relation to left-wing circles).

    There is no idealization of Yeltsin, this is just a satire in relation to the left and right circles of subcultural movements in Russia. If you want to learn more, I advise you to listen to the lectures of Sasha Skul (one of the founders of the YDB movement). �

  4. I don't know how big Yeltsin's idealization is right now. But I can say that it is connected with the current idealization of the past in general. As our condition becomes more unstable, we don't know exactly what to expect next, the future is scary, and we, like people in general, seek solace in what we know and understand. We've already lived through the 90s, so they don't seem so bleak to us. And if you consider that many of those who idealize that time were younger, or, like me, were a child, then this makes that period even more attractive. But in fact, it's unlikely that we would all really want to be in the same situation right now. Someone, by the way, idealizes not Yeltsin, but other leaders, for the same reasons. Only they don't create groups in a contact.

    In addition, Russians, due to various circumstances, have such a feature – we really like to talk about the past. It seems that from our historical perspective, we can solve the current problems by understanding their background in the past. And since Yeltsin is a relatively recent past that precedes our present, then again, the reasons for our current state of confusion, as it seems to some, can be found precisely in what happened then. But this is a fallacy, because even though we caught that time, we still don't know everything, our judgments are based only on very selective facts. Therefore, it is better not to focus on the past, but on the present and try to understand something here.

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