Categories
- Art (356)
- Other (3,632)
- Philosophy (2,814)
- Psychology (4,018)
- Society (1,010)
Recent Questions
- Why did everyone start to hate the Russians if the U.S. did the same thing in Afghanistan, Iraq?
- What needs to be corrected in the management of Russia first?
- Why did Blaise Pascal become a religious man at the end of his life?
- How do I know if a guy likes you?
- When they say "one generation", how many do they mean?
I will only express what I know myself.
Phenomenology is a method of research, even a method of experience, in which the researcher addresses the world as it is given to us.
Roughly speaking, we are used to thinking in a natural attitude: what we see, touch what is outside of our consciousness. The phenomenologist carries out a reduction in relation to this external world and its relation to our consciousness, that is, refrains from judging (called “epoch”) how what exists in the external world and how I see it, hear it, think about it or fantasize about it relate to each other. As a matter of fact, the phenomenological edition refrains from judging whether this external world exists at all, in Husserl's figurative expression, this question is “enclosed in parentheses”.
We can say that the phenomenologist deals with the “thing for us” and refrains from judging “things in themselves”. For example, there is a real object, a tree that can rot or burn down. And there is how I see this tree, or how I imagine, remember the tree. The object may not exist at all, the phenomenologist abstracts from this, for example, you can think (imagine, in a painful case, even see – as a hallucinant sees) about a centaur or the god Jupiter. You can want a unicorn. In all these cases, acts of consciousness have an object, and it does not matter at all whether some object outside of consciousness corresponds to this object or not.
The orientation of acts of consciousness to an object is called intentionality. If I see, then I see something, if I think, then I think about something, if I want, I want something and if I love, that I love something (someone).
Husserl called these objects, these things that intentional experiences are directed at, noems to distinguish them from things outside of consciousness. Acts themselves, or more correctly – intentional experiences (the word act can be misleading, as if there is some kind of action, process): to perceive, fantasize, judge, evaluate, etc. – Husserl calls noeses.
Noema is the intentional correlate of noesis.
Why, for example, in the study of perception, introduce in addition to sensations also noema with noesis?
Sensations are passive matter (hyle), and in the same set of sensations, oddly enough, you can see different things. You can see the plant. You can see the building material. You can see an aesthetically pleasing shape.
There are images that are illusions: for example, “the old woman girl”, a vase in which you can see two faces. In all these cases, the set of sensations is the same, but you can see different things.
It is intentional experience that creates (constitutes) what we see. With my eyes, I see three storns of the cube, but I perceive the cube as a whole, as a three-dimensional object.
To see a tree, you need to see branches and leaves in the whole mass of sensations
Different noeses can correlate with the same noema: you can see, remember, imagine a house. One noesis can have different correlates: you can see a house, a tree, or a person.
Noema can be considered as the meaning of an intentional experience. For example, you can see different pieces of wax, different shapes. However, in all these cases, the core of the noema is the same – wax. And, immediately, you can see wax, clay, plasticine – and see in all of them the material for modeling
All these different visions of the same thing come from consciousness